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Assumptions about discount rates feature in an array of economic models and in policy
appraisals in settings such as climate change, infrastructure investment, and place-based
policies. The rate at which we discount is a description of how we make decisions relating
to the future, and may be informative about responses to policy interventions.1 Revealed
discount rates also provide a means to test whether individuals systematically undervalue
the future (e.g. Busse et al., 2013; Allcott and Wozny, 2014; Cohen et al., 2017; De Groote
and Verboven, 2018).
In this paper we exploit rich property tax and transaction data, the durability of bricks
and mortar, and the high stakes nature of home purchases to make progress in addressing
two related questions: (i) what rates do households use to discount over very long time
horizons; and (ii) when compared to appropriate benchmark interest rates, do these rates
imply departures from fully optimising behaviour? The starting point for our analysis
is that for two houses identical in all respects except the second is liable to pay higher
property taxes, one would expect the first house to trade at a premium to the second. This
premium should equal the present value of the tax difference in perpetuity, from which
we can work out how individuals are implicitly discounting the future. Should discount
rates be close to individuals’ inter-temporal opportunity cost of funds, then there is little
evidence that households are misoptimising in their valuation of future taxes.
Taking this intuition to extensive house sales and tax data spanning around 20 years in
England, our baseline approach exploits inter-jurisdictional variation in property taxes
(Council Tax) by focusing on repeat sales of homes close to local administrative bound-
aries and including boundary-year fixed effects. We generate estimates by comparing
homes of near-identical quality, exploiting assessment practices that group homes with
similar values into 8 tax bands, and controlling for potential differences in the provision
of public goods. In this way we mitigate the issue of correlation of (changes in) taxes with
(changes in) unobserved characteristics of houses and neighbourhoods that have plagued
1Applying private discount rates to social projects is of course extremely contentious; e.g. the debates
around Stern (2007) present opposing views within an environmental context.
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previous studies (further described in Hilber, 2015). To counter any residual concerns
that differences in public good provision across boundaries are driving our estimates, we
show that very similar results can be obtained when we use intra-jurisdictional varia-
tion in taxes. This alternative approach relies on comparisons of neighbouring properties
within the same jurisdiction, and hence which have access to the same public goods.
Identification is achieved by retaining homes close to tax band thresholds and including
threshold-year-location fixed effects. A causal interpretation of our findings is bolstered
because findings across these specifications are largely insensitive to the inclusion of con-
trol variables, and a range of further sample and specification changes.
A well-established insight from urban public finance is that the effect of taxes on home
prices is governed by both a capitalisation rate and a discount rate (e.g. Yinger, 1982; Ross
and Yinger, 1999).2 Hence, the discount rate can only be truly identified if we know the
capitalisation rate. Given that the literature presents a very wide range of capitalisation
parameter estimates, we next use ancillary data to identify the rental capitalisation rate
for the period 2013-2016. We estimate that this rate is close to and not significantly
different from 100%; that is to say, taxes are fully capitalised into rents in our setting. We
then corroborate the rental capitalisation parameter by testing whether tax coefficients
are different between places with elastic and inelastic housing supply, which is relevant
because inelastic housing supply is consistent with full capitalisation (Hilber, 2015). We
find that in the price regressions coefficients are only slightly (and not significantly)
larger in absolute terms in places where housing supply is highly inelastic, which is not
so surprising given the considerable evidence of very stringent regulatory restrictions on
land and a scarcity of developable land in urban areas right across England (e.g Cheshire
and Hilber, 2008; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016).
2For the most part, scholars have focussed on estimating the former by making assumptions about
how home-buyers discount the future. Findings overwhelmingly suggest that property taxes have non-
negligible effects on home values, although the degree of capitalisation is less certain with the more
plausible estimates falling in the range of 50%-100%; see e.g. the recent studies by Basten et al. (2017)
and Lutz (2015) and reviews contained in Yinger (1982) and Ross and Yinger (1999).
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Armed with estimates of tax implied discount rates, our next aim is to shed light on
whether households are making systematic optimisation errors by undervaluing future
property tax liabilities. Under the conservative assumptions of full capitalisation and
that taxes are expected to grow at 0.8% per year in real terms, our baseline findings
indicate that tax implied discount rates are at most 4.1% on average across our sample
time frame. Comparing this to benchmark saving and borrowing rates prevailing during
the same period gives us little reason to believe that households materially undervalue
future tax liabilities when purchasing homes. We advance beyond previous studies by
tracking the evolution of tax implied discount rates over time. Interestingly, we observe
that implied discount rates only diverge from borrowing and savings rates following the
onset of the financial crisis.
We contribute to several literatures. First, our article complements endeavours that
estimate personal discount rates from field data or from experimental choices between
relatively small stakes (and often hypothetical) rewards at specified future dates. The ex-
perimental evidence, which focuses on short time horizons, suggests that households place
little weight on the future.3 The evidence for longer horizons typically derives from obser-
vational data, is more sparse, and encompasses a very wide range of estimates (0-30%).
Some studies centre on narrow groups in society or relatively unusual circumstances such
as military downsizing (Warner and Pleeter, 2001), or energy efficient durable purchases
(e.g. Hausman, 1979). Others obtain discount rates from structural models underpinned
by a variety of assumptions (e.g. Gourinchas and Parker, 2002; Laibson et al., 2007).
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that uses nationwide data on property
taxes and housing transactions to obtain robust estimates of discounting parameters. The
longevity of real estate makes housing markets amenable to the analysis of discounting
over long horizons. Rates obtained from housing settings also benefit from a high degree
of external validity because of widespread market participation and because households
3Frederick et al. (2002) review the experimental literature. Experiments that elicit rates over longer
time spans are rare, although Grijalva et al. (forthcoming) (20 years) is an exception.
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devote a significant share of spending to their homes.4 In this context, the narrow range in
our estimates of 3-4% provides a valuable new reference point for the literature on revealed
personal discount rates. Besides this, understanding discounting in housing markets is
also important in its own right as it may shed light on the relationship between interest
rates and house prices, and because it may be useful to researchers attempting to establish
annualised amenity values (see e.g. Chay and Greenstone, 2005).5
We also contribute to a literature that uses implied discount rates to test for departures
from the standard assumptions that underpin traditional models of behaviour in eco-
nomics (see DellaVigna, 2009). To date, work in this area has focussed on the valuation
of energy efficient features of durable goods. In contrast to our findings, some such papers
imply systematic undervaluation of short to medium term financial flows. For example,
in an early study Hausman (1979) finds that purchases of air conditioners imply discount
rates of around 20% while a later study in the same vein, Cohen et al. (2017), obtain dis-
count rates of 11% in refrigerator transactions. De Groote and Verboven (2018) estimate
that consumers apply discount rates of 15% in solar PV adoption decisions, which they
interpret as considerable undervaluation of future benefits. Recent work has also centred
on the pricing of fuel efficiency in automobile purchases. Allcott and Wozny (2014) find
that a 15% discount rate rationalises purchases (against a real inter-temporal cost of
funds of 6%), whereas Busse et al. (2013) and Sallee et al. (2016) interpret their results
as being consistent with no (or else modest) undervaluation.
Our article also complements recent strands of housing market research. Beginning with
4Around 75% of households in the United Kingdom owned their homes in 2008. Piazzesi and Schnei-
der (2016) show that housing services account for slightly under a fifth of total consumption (including
durables) in the US.
5On the first point Glaeser et al. (2013) note that “...the link between house prices and interest
rates can be reduced substantially by weakening the connection between private discount rates and market
interest rates. The standard asset market approach presumes that private discount rates and market rates
always move together. This relationship means that lower current rates raise the present value of future
appreciation, and hence increase current willingness to pay. The sizable impact of current discount rates
on the value of future gains leads standard models to predict a large impact of interest rates on prices,
especially in high price growth environments. But if private discount rates do not move with market
rates, because buyers are credit constrained, then this channel is eliminated, and the connection between
interest rates and prices is substantially muted.”
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Genesove and Mayer (2001), researchers have looked for evidence of non-rational be-
haviour in housing markets. In a useful reference point for our study, Bradley (2017)
suggests consumers are inattentive to property taxes in Michigan, although in contrast to
our work this paper relates to specific shrouded tax features. Besides this, our study com-
plements recent research that uses fixed-term leasehold tenure to reveal housing market
discount rates that are low at very distant horizons (around 2%) and declining over the
time horizon (Wong et al., 2008; Giglio et al., 2015a,b; Bracke et al., 2018; Fesselmeyer
et al., 2016). Our paper can be distinguished from this literature because here we ex-
plicitly focus on the question of whether households are misoptimising, and because we
use perpetual financial flows associated with property taxes rather than leasehold tenure
to estimate discount rates. One advantage of this source of variation is that, unlike
residential leasehold, property taxes are not specific to a small number of countries or a
small share of homes. More crucially, our approach allows us to be more precise about the
extent to which risk and expectations about future growth drive discount rate estimates.6
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we motivate our em-
pirical work and discuss the institutional setting of our study. Section 2 describes the
econometric framework, and is followed by a discussion of the data and the descriptives in
Section 3. Section 4 presents our main results and in Section 5 we focus on recovering and
interpreting discount rates. Section 6 reports some ancillary regressions and in Section 7
we conclude.
6Intuitively, property taxes are set within a policy framework and grow fairly steadily, while in
contrast, housing is inherently risky and house price growth expectations are difficult to gauge, both
because they are highly location and time specific and because households are prone to wild over-
optimism (Case and Shiller, 2003; Shiller, 2015).
5
1 Background
1.1 Empirical framework
Our empirical work builds upon the urban public finance literature relating to the capital-
isation of property taxes into home values. Following standard household bidding model
assumptions including full household mobility, the equilibrium value (Vi) of home i can
be decomposed into the present value of the flow of housing services minus the present
value of the future stream of property tax payments:7
Vi =
ρ
rH
Hi︸ ︷︷ ︸
pre−tax value
− β
rT
Ti︸︷︷︸
tax discount
(1)
The first term in this capitalisation equation – the before tax value of the home – is the
product of units of housing services (Hi) and the before tax implicit unit price of housing
services ρ. The second term – the discount in home value due to tax – is the product
of the annual property tax payment (Ti) and a tax capitalisation parameter (β). Both
terms are expressed as present values by dividing by annualised discount rates, which can
be interpreted as implied rates of return.
We denote the discount rate on the housing characteristics as rH and the discount rate
on taxes as rT . Following earlier work, we assume that the pre-tax value and taxes
are expected to grow at constant growth rates E(gH) and E(gT ) such that rH and rT
can be interpreted as net of growth discount rates. We put further structure on the
gross discount rates by assuming they can be decomposed into a (common) risk free
rate rf and idiosyncratic risk premia rpH and r
p
T , which may vary across the two terms
according to the riskiness of housing and tax flows respectively. Under these assumptions,
rH = r
f + rpH − E(gH) and rT = rf + rpT − E(gT ).
7This equation can be equivalently derived from asset pricing or utility maximisation approaches (see
e.g Yinger, 1982; Yinger et al., 1988; Ross and Yinger, 1999)
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Returning to equation (1), the underlying bidding model – which assumes perfect mobility
of households and fixed housing supply – and a no arbitrage condition both suggest that
the full present value of future taxes should be reflected in home values i.e. β = 1.
Notwithstanding, the magnitude of β has been treated as an empirical question in a
voluminous literature going back to Oates (1969). Faced with a fundamental difficulty in
separately identifying β and rT using home values, the vast majority of studies, reviewed
in Yinger et al. (1988), Ross and Yinger (1999) and Hilber (2015), have estimated β from
house prices and property taxes given assumptions about rT .
8
Estimates of capitalisation rates range from 0 (i.e. 0%, no capitalisation) to 1.4 (i.e 140%,
more than full capitalisation). Yinger et al. (1988) show that part of this very substan-
tial heterogeneity follows from variation in discount rate assumptions, but at least two
further issues could plausibly drive differences. First, researchers have met identification
challenges with varying degrees of success.9 Second, capitalisation rates may themselves
be determined by a number of factors including: (i) incomplete information; (ii) housing
market frictions such as search costs and taxes, which lead to imperfect mobility; (iii)
housing supply elasticities; and (iv) expectations about future taxes (Yinger, 1982; Ross
and Yinger, 1999; Hilber, 2015). Arguably the most plausible estimates of β use quasi-
experimental approaches to mitigate endogeneity concerns – in particular, Gallagher et al.
(2013) find close to full (100%) capitalisation of property taxes into home values, whereas
Lutz (2015) estimates fall in the range of 70% to 97% for homes in urban areas.
The advantage of using rents (R) rather than prices to estimate capitalisation rates is
that a capitalisation parameter can be obtained without recourse to assumptions about
8The capitalisation rate is important because the extent to which house prices respond to fiscal
variables (i) quantifies household responsiveness to fiscal conditions and is directly informative to un-
derstanding the consequences of policy; (ii) may influence behaviour through generating incentives that
could differ between home-owners and renters; and (iii) may imply (possibly unintended) redistribution
between different groups. For a more complete discussion of these issues see Hilber (2015).
9For example, in their review Yinger et al. (1988) find serious methodological shortcomings with all
prior studies finding zero capitalisation. To the best of our knowledge, other than Elinder and Persson
(2017), no more recent papers have found less than 40% capitalisation.
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the discount rates rT :
Ri = ρHi − β˜Ti (2)
The parameter β˜ here can be related to the parameter in equation (1) if we assume that
Ri ≈ VirH and then multiply through equation (1) on both sides by a discount rate rH .
This yields a relationship between rents, home characteristics, and property taxes. In
particular, when rT = rH , β˜ is directly informative about β. When rT 6= rH , the extent
to which the capitalisation parameter in the rents equation provides a good proxy for the
capitalisation parameter in the price equation depends on the extent of expected growth
and the relative size of the risk premia since β˜ = β(rH/rT ) = β(r
f + rpH − E(gH))/(rf +
rpT − E(gT )).10
To date, only two studies have explicitly attempted to estimate rT or rH within a tax
capitalisation setting. Using a small sample of home sales in California in the early
1990s and a cross-sectional research design, Do and Sirmans (1994) estimate a nominal
discount rate rT= 4% given assumed full capitalisation of taxes. The second, Palmon
and Smith (1998), is perhaps the closest antecedent to our work. These authors use
price and rent data to estimate capitalisation and discount parameters simultaneously
(assuming rT = rH) by regressing imputed rent price ratios for some 450 homes in 1989
on effective property tax rates. Results suggest close to full capitalisation of taxes, and
housing discount rates upwards of 9%. Our work improves on these studies by using
better data and a much more convincing identification strategy.
10Two further points are worth noting. First, if rents can be obtained by dividing Vi by rT then β˜
can be directly interpreted as β even if rT 6= rH . Second, the parameter β˜ in regressions of rents on
property taxes has traditionally been taken to represent a “tax shifting” coefficient that measures the
incidence on taxes on renters. The standard formula for the incidence of tax falling on the demand side
is determined by the ratio of the demand elasticity εD to the sum of the demand and supply elasticities
εS i.e. εD/(εS − εD). This is analogous to the theoretical determinants of the capitalisation rate.
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1.2 Institutional setting
We next describe core institutional information relevant to our empirical work, relegating
a more complete account to Appendix A.1. The main units of local government in
England are Local Authorities (LAs). LAs are responsible for local services including
schools, social services, transport, local parks, and planning matters. Around of quarter
of LA funding is raised from a local property tax, the Council Tax. Key features of this
tax are: (i) it is payable on all domestic homes with the main exemptions being a 25%
discount for those living alone and 100% discount for full time students; (ii) the tax falls
on the home occupier, whether homeowner or renter; (iii) it is not deductible from income
tax; (iv) LAs have wide-reaching enforcement powers and collection rates are very high;
(v) the tax is simple and transparent.
Council Tax varies according to two main factors: annual LA tax setting decisions and
a well publicised nationwide tax schedule for homes in different “tax bands” (Table 1).
Tax bands are determined by an assessment of home value in 1991 (see Table 1 for the
valuation thresholds). Older homes were assigned to tax bands in the early 1990s, while
those built subsequently are assessed following construction. Re-banding is very rare:
official data for 2010/11-2014/15 indicates that 0.2% of homes switch tax band each
year, so the stock of homes in each band is essentially fixed.11 As with the tax schedule,
households are able to obtain information about the Council Tax band for individual
homes easily e.g through online portals or through home sales agents.
Because homes rarely move tax bands, variation in Council tax largely arises through LA
tax setting decisions. Figure 1 maps the tax for home in the middle tax band (Band D) for
LAs in 2016/17. Some of the lowest Band D levies are in London, with Westminster and
11This reflects that there has been no systematic revaluation of homes in England since the initial
valuations in the early 1990s. Homes can be “re-banded” following a successful appeal to the Valuation
Office Agency (VOA), or when changes to the property are detected by officials and a new valuation
concludes the property should be placed in a new band. Where physical improvements result in a
re-valuation, the band is changed at the time of the next sale.
9
Table 1: Council Tax Bands and levies
Band Value in 1991 Ratio to Band D levy
A up to £40,000 6/9
B £40,001 to £52,000 7/9
C £52,001 to £68,000 8/9
D £68,001 to £88,000 9/9
E £88,001 to £120,000 11/9
F £120,001 to £160,000 13/9
G £160,001 to £320,000 15/9
H £320,001 and above 18/9
Wandsworth the outliers with Band D levies of under £700 per year. At the other end of
the spectrum are a mix of LAs including some cities (such as Nottingham and Oxford)
and some rural areas (such as Weymouth and Portland and East Dorset). In some places
adjacent LAs have very different council taxes with annual tax differences for comparable
homes easily exceeding £500 per year. Figure 2 shows the average annual change in
taxes between 1998/99 and 2016/17. One may observe some correlation between the
level and the growth of the level of taxes (e.g. in Southwest London). However, the
correlation between the level of taxes in 1998 and the average annual growth in taxes
1998/99-2016/17 is essentially zero (the correlation is only −0.014).
Council taxes increased more than inflation during the late 1990s and early 2000s under
Labour governments. During this time, central government had powers to intervene to
prevent “excessive” tax rises in LAs but rarely did so. Taxes grew more slowly thereafter.
From around 2004 Council taxes have on average increased in line with inflation. This in
part reflects policy interventions. In particular, since 2012/13 LAs wishing to raise taxes
above 2%, or in some cases 4%, needs to put this to a local referendum (a path which no
LAs has yet pursued). In addition, between 2010/11 and 2014/15, successive governments
provided financial support to LA to fix nominal taxes. Under these policies, LAs that
froze tax received some portion of foregone increases (usually up to 1%) from central
government. The subsidies were withdrawn in 2015/16 and taxes have again begun to
10
Figure 1: Tax in 2016/17
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Figure 2: Tax change 1998/99-2016/17
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rise more rapidly.
Although our main focus is Council Tax, the degree of housing supply elasticity plays an
important role in our later empirical work. It is worthwhile, therefore, to note at this
point that the planning system in Britain is widely viewed as one of the most restrictive
regimes in the world. Numerous planning restrictions – in the form of an unpredictable
decision regime (with no zoning); and extensive urban growth boundaries, building height
restrictions, and preservation policies – severely curtail the supply of space (e.g. Cheshire,
2018). Importantly, while restrictions have been shown to be most drastic in the aﬄuent
South East, the evidence points to tight regulation right across the country. For example,
Cheshire and Hilber (2008) show that restrictions on the supply of office space are equiv-
alent to a tax on construction costs of more than 200% in cities such as Leeds, Glasgow,
Edinburgh, Birmingham, and Manchester (for reference the implied tax in London’s West
End is 800%).
2 Empirical approach
2.1 Estimating β/rT
In the first step in our estimation procedure we exploit the full size of the dataset to
estimate β/rT by using the effect of changes in the Council Tax on changes in housing
values. The basic equation to be estimated yields:
Vit =
ρ
rH
Hi − β
rT
Tit + φt + ωit, (3)
where Hi are time-invariant housing attributes, the vector ρ indicates the impact of
housing attributes, β/rT is the (combined) parameter of interest, φt are year fixed effects
and ωit denotes an identically and independently distributed error term.
The above equation is unlikely to identify a causal effect β/rT because the Council Tax is
13
not uniform over space and likely correlated to features which make places attractive and
that yield higher housing values. Moreover, to the extent Hi does not capture all relevant
housing attributes, a higher Council Tax may be correlated to positive unobserved housing
attributes, because houses with high prices are in higher tax bands. The first step to
mitigate the latter problem is to focus on temporal variation in Council Taxes. Let
us consider a sale in year t and τ (where τ < t) and denoting ∆Vitτ = Vit − Viτ and
∆Titτ = Tit − Tiτ . We then would have:
∆Vitτ = − β
rT
∆Titτ + φκtτ + ∆ωitτ , (4)
where φκtτ is now a year pair×tax band κ specific fixed effect. The large advantage of
using repeat sales is that we plausibly control for many unobserved housing and location
attributes that are fixed over time. Note that the above equation only identifies a causal
effect of taxes if housing and location attributes Hi are indeed fixed over time, or that
changes in housing attributes are uncorrelated to changes in Tit. Our sample restrictions
described in the next Section indeed give us confidence that the homes in our sample
do not undergo significant changes between sales. Moreover, it is assumed that ρ is
constant over time. Given the long time period (1998-2016), the latter seems a more
heroic assumption. We therefore will estimate specifications where we include time-
specific preferences for observable housing and location attributes Hi (e.g. size, an age
proxy, as well as access to open space).
A more problematic assumption in the above equation is that changes in Council Taxes are
uncorrelated to changes in unobserved locational characteristics. This assumption fails
to hold when an LA aims to finance an increase in public goods by increasing Council
Taxes. Since local public goods are thought to capitalise in housing values, β/rT would
be biased towards zero (so that rT would be biased upwards). Another problem may be
that areas with strong price appreciation have fewer incentives to increase Council Taxes
to keep the current level of public goods. Hence, to reduce this potential bias, we will
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focus on repeated sales that occur close (1 or 1.5km) to an LA boundary and include
boundary fixed effects φκbtτ for each boundary b and each year t-τ combination. Including
boundary fixed effects should effectively control for changes in public good provision (and
other local amenities) to the extent the benefits are continuous over space. We test this
more directly by gathering data on total local spending per LA and information on test
scores, denoted by Pit.
A familiar problem in spatially differencing the data is that sorting of households may
occur (Bayer et al., 2007). In our setting, households that disproportionately value certain
public goods may sort themselves in LAs with higher taxes. The changed demographic
composition of an LA may then be valued (or disliked) by incoming households. In
other words, β/rT would not measure the effect of taxes, but captures preferences for
neighbours. In the next Section we indeed show that there seems to be sorting of different
household types along the LA boundary. However, when we compare changes in taxes to
changes in demographics along the LA boundary we do not find any meaningful dynamic
sorting effects.
The preferred specification to be estimated yields:
∆Vitτ = − β
rT
∆Titτ +
ρt − ρτ
rH
Hi +
1
rP
(
f(Pit)− f(Piτ )
)
+ φκbtτ + ∆ωitτ , (5)
where ρtτ and f(·) are both estimated with second-order polynomials to allow for non-
linear preferences.
2.2 Intra-jurisdictional estimates of β/rT
Until this point, all specifications have relied on inter-jurisdictional variation in taxes, i.e.
the identifying variation derives from differences in LA tax setting decisions. We can also
use intra-jurisdictional variation to estimate β/rT by comparing tax and price changes
for homes in the same LA but different tax bands. The advantage of this approach is
15
that it abstracts from differences in LA-wide local public goods, but on the downside
it also means that we are unable to use the year pair×tax band fixed effects employed
in our baseline approach above. This is a considerable disadvantage as these controls
condition out unobserved factors common to homes in the same tax band, which for
example could include trends associated with unobserved home quality characteristics, as
well as expectations (both about future price trends and future taxes) relating to homes
in specific tax bands.
To counter this latter disadvantage, we use the narrowest geographical fixed effects avail-
able to us (postcodes), retain homes with prices close to the tax band thresholds that are
shown in Table 1, and include postcode×year×threshold fixed effects. The identifying
assumption is that the prices of these neighbouring homes in different tax bands would
evolve in the same way absent differences in property tax changes. To determine which
homes lie close to thresholds, all sales prices are deflated to 1995 values using average price
trends in postcode sectors computed using the universe of transactions, then deflated to
1991 values using the Nationwide price index.12 We then estimate:
∆Vitτ = − β
rT
∆Titτ +
ρt − ρτ
rH
Hi + φγdtτ + ∆ωitτ , (6)
where φγdtτ is a fixed effect specific to years of first and second sale, postcode d, and
threshold bands (e.g. homes with 1991-equivalent prices close to the threshold between
bands A and B of £40,000). Note that the term Pitτ is not included here as public good
provision is the same within postcodes, and in any case our measures contain no variation
at this spatial scale due to the way we specify them.
12Other strategies to deflate to 1991 values are of course possible. For this reason we view this
approach as a robustness check on the inter-jurisdictional approach where we can rely on unambiguous
district boundaries.
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2.3 Estimating capitalisation and discount rates separately
The next step is to obtain information about the capitalisation rate, so that we can
identify rT in the previous analysis. We therefore use a subset of the data for which we
also have information on rents Rit to estimate β˜, which we anticipate will be a good proxy
for β. The rentals data are only available for a short-time period (2013-2016). Hence, we
cannot identify the effect of a change in taxes on a change in rents. Nevertheless, we can
spatially difference the data as outlined above. In the spirit of equation (2), we estimate:
Rit = −β˜Tit + ρHi + f(Pit) + φκbt + ωit. (7)
Here the identifying assumption is that the effects of spatial differences in unobserved
housing or neighbour attributes at the LA boundary are uncorrelated to spatial differences
in the Council Tax. Because we will show that there is sorting along the LA boundary
that may thwart a causal interpretation of β˜, we repeat the above analysis for prices:
Vit = − β
rT
Tit +
ρ
rH
Hi +
1
rP
f(Pit) + φκbt + ωit, (8)
where the estimated β/rT should be (very) comparable to the previous analysis using
repeat sales. Hence, equation (8) is an over-identification test of whether β˜ measures a
causal effect of taxes on rents.
3 Data
3.1 Data sources
To measure the discount rate, we use data on home sales, rentals, and property taxes.
We provide key information about our data here and further details in Appendix A.3.
The Land Registry Price Paid dataset provides us with the universe of home sales in
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England between 1995 and April 2017. The data records the transaction price, the
date the sale was registered (which proxies for the actual date of sale), the full address
including postcode, the type of house (flat, detached house, semi-detached house, terraced
(or row) house), a new build indicator, and the tenure (leasehold or freehold). There is no
publicly available data for home rentals for England, so we rely on a dataset obtained from
Homelet, the UK’s largest tenant referencing and specialist lettings insurance company.
This data covers 2013-2017 and includes no information on the characteristics of homes
other than the full address of the property, the date of the rental agreement, and the
monthly rent. Due to the paucity of home characteristics in these data, we match in
additional variables – including number of rooms; floor area; wall construction type, and
the number of home extensions – from Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs).
Council Tax band information was obtained from the website mycounciltax.org.uk using
web scraping techniques in early to mid 2017. The home level data contains the full
property address and the contemporaneous tax band. The fact that we are unable to
observe previous tax assessments is unlikely to be a major threat as re-banding is so rare
(0.20-0.25% each year). Using this tax band information, tables from the Department of
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) allow us to compute the annual Council
Tax payable at the time of each home sale or rental.13
We geocode and append geographical variables using Postcode Directories, and use GIS
techniques to identify transactions that lie within fixed distances of Local Authority
boundaries.14 The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Administration (CIPFA)
provides us with LA expenditure on services per head of population for financial years
1997/98-2016/17. We generate yearly postcode level school quality measures by averaging
13Specifically, we compute the annual tax payable using the Local Authority-wide average Band D
Council Tax for each financial year in the DCLG data and then scale this to match the band of the
property in question using the ratio shown in Table 1. We also compute for robustness checks tax
payments at the parish level for a subset of our data – see Appendix B.2 for details. The correlation
between taxes measured at the parish and LA levels in our data is 0.997.
14Boundary samples are computed for both pre-2009 and post-2009 LAs. These samples are highly
similar: we use the post-2009 boundaries which contain fewer boundaries.
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Maths and English test scores for pupils aged 8-11 (Key Stage 2) available from the
Department of Education. We create two measures which are both based on the inverse-
distance weighted score of this school quality measure in the nearest four schools in a
given year. Our primary measure is constructed using tests scores only for schools in the
associated Local Education Authority (LEA), and as such can vary discontinuously at
LA boundaries. A second measure, which we use for robustness, is computed across the
nearest four schools regardless of LEA. We calculate a time invariant measure of access
to green space at the postcode level using data for 2015 from Ordnance Survey and data
on parks and gardens from the National Heritage List for England. The share of green
space is computed using two distance buffers (0-500m and 500-1,000m).
3.2 Sample restrictions
We make a number of sample restrictions to remove outliers, to minimise unobserved
home changes, and to mitigate measurement error. Further details are listed in the
Appendix A.4. To remove outliers we exclude the top and bottom 1% of prices (or rents)
and the top and bottom 1% of prices (or rents) in each tax-band. We also drop homes
in three LAs which are extreme outliers in terms of population size or expenditure on
local services, which we define as more than double the 99th percentile or less than half
the 1st percentile. We next remove homes for which characteristics change during our
sample timespan.15 This entails dropping homes with 1 or more extension at the time
of any certificate, homes where the floor area of the property moves by more than 20%
from the median value for the home in the data, and homes that are recorded as being
“new” more than once, which likely indicates redevelopment. We also remove homes that
15There are at least three reasons why we wish to remove these homes. First, time-varying char-
acteristics renders repeat sales approaches invalid and removing homes that change characteristics is a
common strategy in research using repeat sales (see e.g Bajari et al. (2012) and Standard and Poors
Case-Shiller Home Price Indices Index Methodology). Second, removing homes with time- varying char-
acteristics means we can use time-invariant home characteristics to control for changing preferences
and/or variation in maintenance costs between property types (Harding et al., 2007). Third, time-
varying characteristics may imply measurement error in the tax variable because we are unable to access
the full tax band history of the house and are therefore unable to tell whether each home has been
reassigned to a different Council Tax band during our sample time-frame.
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were new at the previous sales from our repeat sales data as these homes are likely to
depreciate at a different rate to other homes. We make one additional restriction each
for rentals and sales. For sales, we drop leasehold homes as we cannot observe the lease
length. For rentals, we remove homes that only appear once in our rental sample (some
40% of rentals) on the basis that these rentals may represent long-term agreements in
which the agreed rent may not reflect the market value of renting the home for one year
i.e. the capitalisation rate may partly capture a discount rate. We show sensitivity to
many of these sample selections in Table B2 in Appendix B.2.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Our primary dataset is composed of 2.3 million consecutive repeat home sales pairs that
have a second sale taking place between 9 months and 8 years of the original sale. De-
scriptive statistics for this dataset are shown in Table 2. Panel A describes the full dataset
both without sample restrictions (LHS) and with restrictions (RHS). Panel B of Table
2 repeats this format but describes the sales that lie within 1 km of a boundary with
a different LA, which is our main boundary buffer distance. Due to the nature of the
sample restrictions, we expect the mean sales price, size of home, and Council Tax in the
restricted sample to be lower than the full sample. We indeed find that this is the case.
Table 2 also highlights that sales in the restricted 1km boundary sample have a slightly
lower average Council Tax than the full unrestricted sample and benefit from a somewhat
higher LA spending per head.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: repeat sales
———– Without restrictions ———– ———– With restrictions ———–
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Panel A: full sample
Price 199684.93 182787.62 195.00 17000000.00 173236.99 92195.98 31000.00 775000.00
Tax 1184.13 355.83 331.89 3450.88 1139.88 316.71 331.89 2970.57
KS2 score % 0.82 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.82 0.08 0.00 1.00
LA spend/head 673.53 639.04 60.32 2854.64 666.97 634.70 60.32 2854.64
Greenspace 0-500m % 0.07 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.96
Rooms 4.73 1.43 0.00 85.00 4.39 1.26 1.00 77.00
Built after 1995 % 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Extensions 0.53 0.72 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Quarters b/w sales 15.83 7.80 4.00 32.00 15.76 7.76 4.00 32.00
Observations (pairs) 2,287,002 1,070,284
Panel B: 1km boundary sample
Price 235862.45 277036.35 1500.00 17000000.00 170782.33 89589.30 31000.00 775000.00
Tax 1227.42 375.77 331.89 3450.88 1093.09 283.84 331.89 2804.42
KS2 score % 0.82 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.81 0.08 0.00 1.00
LA spend/head 782.10 676.77 60.32 2854.64 793.02 657.82 64.09 2797.94
Greenspace 0-500m % 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.97 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.96
Rooms 4.76 1.44 0.00 71.00 4.28 1.15 1.00 45.00
Built after 1995 % 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Extensions 0.53 0.72 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Quarters b/w sales 16.05 7.80 4.00 32.00 15.40 7.25 4.00 32.00
Observations (pairs) 649,287 187,051
3.4 Sorting
Sorting of households may threaten our identification to the extent that households move
to LAs not because of their preferences for public goods and taxes, but to be close to other
households that sort for these considerations. In other words, β/rT would not just capture
the effect of taxes but also preferences for neighbours. We use Census data for Output
Areas (OAs) to assess the extent to which demographic variables are correlated with
property taxes across LA boundaries in 2011 (Figure 3), and changes in taxes between
census years 2001 and 2011 (Figure 4). To obtain the figures, we first select OAs in
boundary samples, then assign them low or high tax side of boundary based on taxes in
2011 or changes in taxes between 2001 and 2011.16 Some OAs are close to multiple LA
boundaries so we drop any on the high tax of one boundary but the low side of another.
We assign each OA to a distance bin for each boundary sample they fall in, based on
the median distance to the boundary of postcodes that lie both within the OA and the
boundary sample. Distance is coded as negative for the lower tax side of the boundary.
We then run OA regressions of various Census variables on distance bin dummy variables,
where the dependent variables are standardised by deducting the boundary sample mean
and dividing by the boundary sample standard deviation.
Figure 3 shows some evidence that individuals with higher income and education levels
are located on the higher tax side of boundaries in 2011, possibly because they have a
stronger preference for the public goods that are provided by the (higher) Council Tax.
However, there are no clear patterns with regard to changes in taxes between 2001 and
2011 (see Figure 4). The latter is important, as our main identification strategy relies on
temporal variation in taxes and house prices around LA boundaries.
16Note that here we restrict attention to those boundaries that have large (above median) differences
in tax. We obtain near-identical results if we keep all boundaries.
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Figure 3: 2011 Census
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Figure 4: Changes between 2001 and 2011 Censuses
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4 Estimates of β/rT
4.1 Inter-jurisdictional estimates
Table 3 reports estimates of β/rT in which we regress sale prices on property taxes and
control variables. In all cases regressions are performed on data samples using the re-
strictions described above. Standard errors are clustered on post-2009 Local Authorities.
Furthermore, the inclusion of year pair×tax band fixed effects in all regressions in this
Table implies that identification is achieved by comparing across properties that are in
the same tax band, but subject to different LA-wide tax levies. In other words, we are
estimating tax capitalisation parameters from inter-jurisdictional variation in taxes.
Column (1) is the most basic specification which absorbs common trends in different
labour market areas by using a three-way fixed effects interaction between year pair, tax
band, and Travel to Work Area (TTWA).17 Results imply that a one pound increase in
tax leads to a house price decrease of £73.79. Based on the assumption that β is between
0.75 and 1 (i.e. the range implied by Lutz, 2015), the implied discount rate rT is between
0.010 and 0.014.18 One potential problem with this specification is that changes in taxes
may be correlated with price dynamics of urban areas. In particular, the resurgence and
gentrification of city centres in our sample period may have reduced relative pressure on
budgets in LAs in the centre of TTWAs while simultaneously pushing up local house
prices.19 To counter the impact of this potential confounder, in column (3) we control
for distance to the city centre by interacting the fixed effects with a categorical variable
capturing the decile of postcode distance to the TTWA centre. The result is that impact
of the Council Tax becomes considerably smaller such that the implied discount rate rT
with full capitalisation (β = 1) is around 0.03.
17TTWAs are defined by commuting patterns and can be thought of as labour-market areas. These
are 149 TTWA areas in England in the most recent data recorded by the Office for National Statistics
18The standard errors of the implied discount rate are calculated using the delta method.
19We define the centre of the TTWA using the average x and y co-ordinates of all sales in the Land
Registry.
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Table 3: Inter-jurisdictional estimates of average β/r
(Dep var: ∆ sale price in £)
Dependent variable: ∆ sale price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Council Tax -73.79∗∗∗ -32.59∗ -30.75∗∗∗ -26.30∗∗∗ -29.46∗∗∗ -30.38∗∗∗
(17.896) (19.223) (9.492) (8.925) (8.407) (8.429)
Quadratic in LA spend per head X X
Quadratic in KS2 test score X X
Local green space×years X
Home characteristics×years X
Year pairs×band×TTWA X
Year pairs×band×TTWA×Distance X
Year pairs×band×1.5km BFE X
Year pairs×band×1km BFE X X X
Implied r; β=0.75 0.010∗∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Implied r; β=1 0.014∗∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.018) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
Number of sales pairs 1070255 931259 372430 186843 186843 186843
R2 0.663 0.731 0.768 0.759 0.759 0.767
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered on post 2009 Local Authorities. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p
< 0.1. All regressions are first difference specifications estimated in levels that include only repeat sales with
fixed characteristics. Column (1) include dummies for financial year of first and subsequent sale (year pairs)
interacted with tax band and TTWA. Column (2) further interact these effects with a categorical variable
that puts each postcode in one of ten bins according to distance to TTWA centre. Columns (3)-(6) replace
TTWA with boundary fixed effects as indicated. Home characteristics interacted with year pairs in Column
(6) are property type, no of rooms, wall construction type, built after 1995 indicator. Standard errors for
implied r computed using the delta method.
All remaining columns in Table 3 are based on boundary samples and include boundary
fixed effects (BFE) instead of TTWAs. In column (3) we only include observations
within 1.5km of an LA boundary. Results are similar to column (2) but are now more
precisely estimated. The estimates are essentially unchanged if we use a 1km buffer (see
column (4), Table 3). To further investigate whether differences in public goods across
LA boundaries are correlated to tax changes, column (5) includes quadratic terms in LA
spending per head and school test scores. This leads to comparable results. Column (6)
adds interactions between year pairs and home or neighbourhood characteristics (property
type, number of rooms, wall construction type, access to green space) to allow for time-
varying preferences for these features. The implied discount rate rT is 0.033 under full
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capitalisation, and 0.025 when β = 0.75.
4.2 Intra-jurisdictional estimates
Table 4 reports results from the intra-jurisdictional approach described in equation (6)
which uses very narrow geographical fixed effects, and retains homes with prices close to
the tax band thresholds that are shown in Table 1. Homes are allocated to a threshold
using two alternative rules. The specification in columns (1) and (2) include homes
with 1991 values within £5,000 of a threshold e.g. homes with 1991 values in the range
£35,000-45,000 for the A-B threshold and £315,000-325,000 for the G-H threshold. In
column (3) the bandwidth is instead set at 10% of the relevant threshold. Column (1) is
a basic specification that includes only fixed effects and no home characteristics. These
are added in the later columns. Estimated coefficients are somewhat less precise, but
all are broadly similar to our baseline results in column (6) of Table 3. For example,
the estimates in column (2) indicate that the implied discount rate is 0.030 with full
capitalisation, which is very close to the baseline estimates. We conclude that inter- and
intra-jurisdictional variation imply similar discount rates.
5 Discount rates
5.1 Disentangling rT and β
Based on our reading of the existing property tax capitalisation literature, in the analysis
above we assumed β ∈ [0.75, 1] to provide a range of discount rates for our baseline
specification of rT ∈ [0.025, 0.033]. Given the wide diversity in estimates from other
settings, this range is sufficiently narrow to be a valuable addition to the literature on
revealed discount rates. Notwithstanding, to recover a single discount rate from β/rT
requires a single value of β. One proposition is to assume full capitalisation i.e. β = 1.
This is attractive both because it provides a plausible upper bound on the discount rate,
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Table 4: Intra-jurisdictional estimates of average β/r
(Dep var: ∆ sale price in £)
Dep var: ∆ sale price (1) (2) (3)
∆ Council Tax -40.36∗∗∗ -33.60∗∗∗ -37.11∗∗∗
(12.191) (12.507) (13.043)
Home characteristics×years X X
Yr pairs×postcode×ThresholdFE X X X
Threshold rule: fixed 5k fixed 5k 10% of
for all for all cut–off
Implied r; β=0.75 0.019∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Implied r; β=1 0.025∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
Number of sales pairs 37699 37699 33384
R2 0.916 0.916 0.918
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered on post 2009 Local
Authorities. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. All regressions
rely on observations close to tax band thresholds set out in Table 1 and
include threshold fixed effects interacted with years of sales and postcode
indicators. To determine which homes lie close to thresholds, all sales
prices are deflated to 1995 values using average price trends in postcode
sectors computed using the universe of transactions, then deflated to
1991 values using the Nationwide price index. Homes are allocated to a
threshold using two different rules. Specifications in columns (1) and (2)
include homes with 1991 values within £5,000 of a threshold e.g. homes
with 1991 values in the range £35,000-45,000 for the A-B threshold and
£315,000-325,000 for the G-H threshold. In column (3) the bandwidth
is set at 10% of the relevant threshold.
and because it is consistent with a vast number of studies that value amenities such as
school and environmental quality or transport innovations using house prices under the
assumption that capitalisation is full. In this section, we provide further evidence to
assess the validity of such an assumption.
Although we cannot estimate β directly using house prices, we can estimate β˜, the rental
capitalisation rate. Panel A of Table 5 reports specifications in which we identify this
parameter using cross-sectional spatial variation.20 In the first column we estimate a
(non-significant) capitalisation rate of 0.97 with a specification that controls for housing
20We use inter-jurisdictional variation here. We cannot use intra-jurisdictional variation because we
do not observe the sales prices of homes in the rental sample, so we cannot tell if they are close to
taxband thresholds.
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attributes but not public goods using the 1km boundary sample. Column (2) adds con-
trols for LA spending, test scores, and access to green space. This specification suggests
the capitalisation rate β˜ is slightly above but not statistically significantly different from
one, meaning that one pound increase in taxes leads to a one pound decrease in rents. We
note that these results are not very precise, due to a much lower number of observations
and often little variation in taxes between adjacent LAs. In Columns (3) and (4) we
therefore use the larger 1.5km boundary sample. The point estimates are very similar to
the previous specifications and close to one, and slightly more precisely estimated. We
thus find that renters bear little of the property tax burden. This is largely consistent
with findings in the literature (Carroll and Yinger, 1994).21
A main worry is that a cross-sectional identification strategy is less convincing in identi-
fying a causal effect of taxes on rents, e.g. because of sorting. In Panel B of Table 5 we
therefore repeat the rental analysis but using our repeat sales sample and again taking
the sales price again as the dependent variable. This implies that we again identify β/rT .
When these estimates are similar to the analyses using temporal variation in taxes and
prices, this will increase the confidence that β˜ can be interpreted as a causal estimate.
The results in Panel B of Table 5 indeed strongly suggests that the results are robust, as
the effects are remarkably similar to the preferred specifications reported in Table 3.
These results suggest that property taxes fully capitalise in rents. However, given the
discussion in Section 1.1 we have no direct way to ascertain that β˜ = β.22 In Table 6, we
21More specifically, Carroll and Yinger (1994) find that in a US setting where the legal incidence of
the tax is on the landlord that, “a £1.00 increase in property taxes results in a rent increase of only
about £0.15, on average, even if the underlying supply curve for housing is very elastic (that is, even if
landlords have many options)”.
22Although comparing our results to Bracke et al. (2018) suggests that β˜ is a good proxy for β since
β˜ = β rHrT . Bracke et al. (2018) estimate net of growth average discount rates on future housing service
flows (rH in our notation) in Prime Central London (PCL) of 4.1% in 1987-1991 and 2.5% for the period
2004-2013. We cannot directly replicate the Bracke et al. (2018) geographical setting since we have
too few data points in PCL (the highly urbanised core of London containing parts of Westminster and
Kensington & Chelsea (2 LAs)). But we can use Inner London – an area that subsumes PCL but is
larger (roughly 320 km2, containing 15 of the 32 LAs in London). In Table 6 we estimated that rT=
2.8% in Inner London across the period 1998-2016. Replicating this for the period 2004-2013, we obtain
an estimate of 2.3%. This suggests a close correspondence between rH and rT .
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Table 5: Cross sectional rent and price regressions
(Dep var: rent or sale price in £)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
—–1km buffers—– —–1.5km buffers—–
Panel A: taxes and rents
Council Tax -0.97 -1.14∗ 0.94∗∗ -1.09∗∗
(0.59) (0.63) (0.46) (0.51)
Observations 24106 24106 34970 34970
R2 0.742 0.742 0.742 0.742
Panel B: taxes and sale prices
Council Tax -27.65∗ -26.58∗ -30.83∗ -29.94∗
(14.65) (14.57) (16.23) (16.43)
Observations 81093 81093 118038 118038
R2 0.935 0.936 0.931 0.932
Quadratic in LA spend per head X X
Quadratic in KS2 test scores X X
Local green space X X
Home characteristics X X X X
Year×taxband×BFE X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered on post 2009 Local Authorities. ***
p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. All regressions are cross-sectional specifications
estimated in levels and exclude (i) outliers which are defined at the top and bottom
1% of rents or prices and the top and bottom 1% of rents or prices in each tax-band (ii)
homes that have more than one extension. Rental regressions further exclude homes
that appear only once in the sample. Price regressions further exclude leaseholds.
Home characteristics are number of rooms and number of rooms squared, energy
efficiency rating, and a three-way interaction between property type, wall type (cavity,
solid, unknown), has fireplace.
therefore take a different approach to assessing β. Our starting position is to assume that
β = 1 in places with very inelastic housing supply such that estimates can be interpreted
as 1/rT , building on theoretical and empirical findings (detailed in Appendix A.2) in the
capitalisation literature that β should be higher (in absolute terms) when housing supply
is less elastic (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004; Hilber and Mayer, 2009; Hilber et al., 2011;
Hilber, 2015; Lutz, 2015). Specifically, we interact the tax variable in column (6) of Table
3 with various indicators capturing housing supply elasticity.
In the first two columns we find that the the tax coefficient is smaller in absolute terms in
rural places than our baseline findings (column (1)), and larger in inner London (column
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Table 6: Housing supply elasticities
(Dep var: ∆ sale price in £)
Dep var: ∆ sale price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Elastic=1 × ∆ Tax -23.14∗∗∗ -29.21∗∗∗ -28.30∗∗∗ -33.52∗∗∗ -31.01∗∗∗ -28.93∗∗∗
(8.822) (8.144) (8.540) (9.339) (9.793) (9.923)
Elastic=0 × ∆ Tax -30.45∗∗∗ -35.82∗∗∗ -32.42∗∗∗ -30.79∗∗∗ -31.24∗∗∗ -31.11∗∗∗
(8.420) (10.688) (8.136) (8.689) (10.413) (8.042)
Housing supply rural other vs share LA share share
measure: vs inner land refusal homes homes
urban London dev’able rate CA GreenBelt
Implied r; Elastic=0 0.033∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(β=1) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
Number of sales pairs 186843 186843 186843 186843 161406 186843
R2 0.767 0.767 0.767 0.767 0.768 0.767
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered on post 2009 Local Authorities. *** p < 0.01,
** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. All regressions are as column (6) of Table 3 but interacts ∆ Tax with
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when housing supply is expected to be more elastic.
In column (1) this is postcodes in a non-urban setting; in column (2) postcodes outside inner
London; in column (3) above median share of LA land that is developable (average in 1991, 2001,
and 2011); column (4) below median LA refusal rate on major housing development planning
applications (average 1991-2013); column (5) below median LA share of homes in Conservation
Areas (2005); column (6) below median LA share of homes in Green Belt (2011).
(2)). The difference is statistically significant for urban vs rural (where a β parameter
of around 0.75 for rural places would imply a discount rate of 3.3%) but not for inner
London vs elsewhere. In the remaining columns of Table 6 we find little evidence of
material differences in the tax coefficients in places with different housing supply elasticity
as measured by above or below median share of developable land (column (3)), planning
refusal rate (column (4)), proportion of homes in Conservation Areas (column (5)), or
share homes in Green Belts (column (6)).23 Overall these results suggest that estimates
are largely insensitivity to variation in housing supply elasticity. Moreover, in support of
our previous findings in all cases we find the implied discount rate in places with tighter
housing supply elasticity (where β is plausibly equal to one) is close to 3%.
23We obtain the counter-intuitive result that the coefficient is slightly more negative in places with
below median LA refusal rate on major housing developments in column (4). This may reflect a well-
known endogeneity issue with the refusal rate that arises because highly restrictive LAs may discourage
developers from making planning applications (e.g Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016).
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5.2 Tests for inter-temporal optimisation
One general test for optimising behaviour, widely used in studies of purchases of energy
efficient durable goods, is that households should be indifferent between £1 in purchase
cost and £1 of future costs discounted at the appropriate inter-temporal opportunity
cost rate. Previous studies have typically found some degree of undervaluation of future
financial flows relative to those in the present. To apply this test in our setting, we adopt
a null hypothesis that households discount future property taxes at the opportunity costs
of funds, and an alternative hypothesis that households undervalue the future.
To conduct the test, we assume that β = 1. This value for β is supported by the
evidence in previous sections. In addition, to the extent that full capitalisation provides
an upper bound on the β parameter value, in light of our hypotheses this is a conservative
assumption. This is because values of β less than 1 would imply lower discount rates, and
hence make it less likely that we conclude that households are undervaluing the future.24
As rT is a net of growth discount rate, we must also adjust our baseline value of rT = 0.033
for expected tax growth. In our setting, property taxes – as measured by the ‘Council
tax and & rates’ element of the Retail Price Index (series DOBR) adjusted into real
terms using the RPI all items index (series CHAW) – grew on average at a slightly
faster rate (0.8%) than inflation between 1989 and 2016. However, tax movements are
tightly correlated with changes in Local Authority spending (correlation 0.82 1998-2016
using the CIPFA spending data) so that average real net increases in taxes over spending
are approximately zero. Using these values as bounds we conclude that average growth
adjusted discount rates for the period 1998-2016 lie in the range [0.033, 0.041]. The
implied 95% confidence intervals place discount rate in the range [0.015, 0.059].
24More generally, one may argue that when β < 1 for reasons other than elastic housing supply, this
also may be considered as a departure from rationality. As such, even if β 6= 1 then we can undertake a test
for rationality by assuming β = 1 and comparing the implied discount rate to appropriate opportunity
cost rates.
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We cannot directly observe the opportunity cost of funds for individual home purchasers
in our data so we compare this range to benchmark opportunity cost rates for the period
1998-2016 obtained from aggregate data. Our first benchmark rates is the real long risk
free rate. We obtain an estimate of 1.1% from the average annual real yield for the
Government Liability curve for maturities of 1-25 years between 1998 and 2016 using
Bank of England data. Our second benchmark rate is a candidate real mortgage rate.
We use the 1998-2016 average of the fixed 2 year 75% LTV mortgage rate of 2.3%. This
is derived from the Bank of England (series IUMBV34) adjusted into real terms using the
contemporaneous inflation rate. Together these provide a range of benchmark interest
rates of [0.011, 0.023].25
We interpret these estimates as presenting no strong evidence that households materially
undervalue future property taxes in this context. Although average tax implied discount
rates are slightly higher than the lowest benchmark rate, this gap is an order of magnitude
smaller than those obtained in the literature on energy efficient durable goods described
above. Moreover, it is important to recall that these rates are long-term averages. As we
show in the next section, the residual difference in these average values is driven by the
emergence of very low market rates following the 2008 financial crisis.
5.3 Time variation
We next shed further light on the relationship between discount rates and benchmark
market interest rates by plotting the evolution of rT over time. Because these regres-
sions require a considerable number of sales in each period, we use the 1.5km boundary
sample.26
25As an alternative we could use the CAPM to derive a benchmark rate. Changes in real taxes
are positively correlated with changes in real household final consumption expenditure per head which
indicates that taxes fall when consumption falls, i.e. taxes hedge aggregate consumption risk. However,
average real net increases in taxes over spending are uncorrelated with consumption growth (correlation
0.09). We thus anticipate that the risk premium should be approximately zero, and hence using the risk
free rate should be sufficient.
26Regressions from this exercise generate a high number of coefficients. We plot transformations of
these coefficients along with standard errors in various Figures below. Tabulations of results can be
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We first estimate a specification in which we estimate time variation in rT under the
assumption of full capitalisation. Our approach involves interacting time dummies with
the tax variable (transformed appropriately – see equation (B.1) in Appendix B.1 for
more details) and plotting the reciprocal of the resulting coefficients on the tax variables
in Figure 5. Here, the black line represents the time path of rT (under the assumption
of full capitalisation and adjusted for growth of 0.8%.), and the shaded area represents
the bounds of the 95% confidence interval around the point estimates. The resulting
pattern is somewhat scattered but most estimates fall in the range of 3 to 4%. The point
estimates are statistically indistinguishable from one another, suggesting that rT is stable
over the full span of our sample.
Figure 5 also plots the same proxies for the real long risk-free rate (dashed red line)
and the real mortgage rate (dashed blue line) described above. A comparison of the two
figures indicates a close correspondence between our estimates of rT and the real risk-
free rate in the period up to and including 2007/2008, but thereafter this relationship
breaks down: the tax implied discount rates remain fairly flat while the risk-free rate falls
towards and then under zero. In other words, implied discount rates become disconnected
from the real long yield from 2008 onwards, a finding which is consistent with Bracke
et al. (2018) who similarly find no evidence of a drop in rH in samples either side of the
period October 2008 and March 2009 in their study of leaseholds.
What is behind these patterns? One possible explanation is tightening credit conditions.
For example Butt et al. (2014) highlight that spreads between borrowing rates facing
households and nominal risk free rates increased sharply from 2008 onwards. Another is
sticky borrowing rates that arise because of fixed rate mortgages. Central government
interventions to limit Council tax increases from around 2008 suggest it is less likely that
changes in risk or heightened expectations about future tax hikes underpin these results.
A further possibility is that unobserved changes in the capitalisation rate are driving
provided on request.
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Figure 5: Implied changes in rT
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these patterns in the data. Although we cannot fully rule this out, we show in Appendix
B.1 that when we estimate rT over time, but interact taxes with above/below median
share developable land averaged over 1991 and 2011, or above/below median change in
share developable land between 1991 and 2011, we obtain very similar results for the
evolution of rT in elastic and inelastic places. We obtain highly similar results when we
use other measures of the housing supply elasticity.
6 Ancillary regressions
6.1 Sensitivity
We perform a number of sensitivity tests on our preferred repeat sales specification in
column (6) of Table 3. These are reported in Appendix B.2. In summary, we find that
our results are insensitive to a number of specification changes e.g. when all currency
variables are expressed in 2015 values using the Consumer Price Index, when we introduce
more LA level controls variables, or when we allow test scores to vary discontinuously at
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LA boundaries. Furthermore, findings are robust to various alternative sample selections,
including removing a greater proportion of outlying observations, relaxing selections on
home extensions, and removing small homes that may have only a single occupier (and
hence may qualify for reduced taxes).
6.2 Heterogeneity
We allow for heterogeneous effects by testing the effect of taxes on house prices over
the distribution of tax changes in our data, by first generating a categorical variable for
the decile of the tax change in our main sample and then interacting this bin variable
with the tax change. This permits us to use a more flexible functional form but is also
motivated by experimental findings that small future amounts are discounted at a higher
rate than larger amounts (e.g. Frederick et al., 2002). Point estimates (blue dots) and
the 95% confidence interval (black whiskers) are plotted in Figure 6. The effect of taxes
on home values is stable across the distribution of tax changes (although for the smallest
changes the estimates are imprecise).27
We subject our analysis range of further heterogeneity tests in which we interact property
taxes with a variety of indicator variables in Appendix B.3. Although we cannot observe
characteristics of home buyers, in general we find little evidence for heterogeneity. Esti-
mated tax coefficients are highly similar for: homes of different value; homes in different
regions; and homes in neighbourhoods with different socio-economic characteristics. This
is at least suggestive evidence that the discount rates we uncover can be considered to
be a broadly applicable parameter.
27We also show in Appendix B.3 that we obtain similar results when we repeat this exercise but taking
deciles in the initial tax level (rather than the tax change).
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Figure 6: Effect of taxes on home values for different size tax changes
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6.3 Expected tax growth and risk
In recovering discount rates in Section 5, we assumed homogeneous tax growth and no
role for idiosyncratic risk. Several institutional features described in Section 1.2 preclude
substantial tax increases. First, homes rarely move to higher tax bands in our setting.
Second, the scope for LAs to make substantial across-the-board hikes is limited by policies
(central government interventions prior to 2008, the need to obtain approval from local
referenda and interventions by central government to incentivise tax freezes thereafter).
Taken together, these factors suggest that idiosyncratic risk and tax growth expectations
are unlikely to be major determinants of discount rates in this context.
This intuition is tested in estimates reported in Table 7 where we find little evidence that
discount rates covary with measures of uncertainty and a proxy for expected tax growth.
One way to measure uncertainty is political instability. In places where the composition
of the local Council is prone to change, we might expect to find a greater variability in
taxes as local parties seek to implement their preferred policies. In column (1) of Table
7, we repeat our baseline specification but adding the interaction between ∆ Tax and
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Table 7: Risk and average tax growth interactions
(Dep var: ∆ sale price in £)
Dep var: ∆ sale price (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Council Tax -29.89∗∗∗ -30.78∗∗∗ -29.20∗∗∗ -31.00∗∗∗
(8.231) (8.021) (8.190) (8.229)
× SD highest seat share in local elections -0.76
(1.343)
× SD Council Tax 0.19 1.14
(2.271) (2.401)
× Mean annual % Council Tax growth -0.91 -1.34
(1.454) (1.520)
Number of sales pairs 186843 186843 186843 186843
R2 0.767 0.767 0.767 0.767
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered on post 2009 Local Authorities. *** p <
0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1.
the (standardised) standard deviation of the share of seats held by the largest party in
the LA throughout our sample period. We find no evidence that political instability is
associated with discount rates. In column (2), we replace the political measure with the
(standardised) standard deviation of the annual percentage change in Council tax in the
LA over our sample period. Again we find no evidence for differences in discount rates in
LAs with more or less volatile tax changes. In column (3), we examine whether differences
in expected growth in taxes affects our estimates by deploying the mean percentage change
in taxes in the LA over the sample period in the interaction term. The interaction is not
significant. Finally, in column (4), we again obtain no significant effect when we include
interactions with both the first and second moments simultaneously.
7 Conclusions
Discount rates are central in many fields of economics and finance as well as in policy
appraisals. Revealed discount rates also facilitate a test for deviations from the standard
assumptions that underpin traditional models of behaviour in economics. In this paper
we assess how home buyers value the very long term using a novel source of variation:
property taxes. Such taxes are used in a wide range of institutional settings and are
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usually economically large.28
Our empirical work draws on extensive home transaction data and spatio-temporal vari-
ation in property taxes in England in the period 1998-2016. Across a variety of samples
and specifications, our research implies that average discount rates implied by taxes are
in the region of 3 to 4%. These rates are – as far as we can tell with available data –
largely homogeneous. Our estimates add to a sparse literature that estimates long-term
discount rates using observational data (e.g. Hausman, 1979; Warner and Pleeter, 2001;
Laibson et al., 2007), and complement experimental work focussed on shorter horizons.
Findings may be of particular interest to researchers that wish to estimate annualised
amenity values using house prices.
We also provide new evidence on the extent of property tax capitalisation rate for Eng-
land. In common with recent quasi-experimental evidence from the US (Lutz, 2015),
but in contrast to recent work using Swiss data that finds less than full capitalisation of
income taxes differentials into rents (Basten et al., 2017), we find that the capitalisation
rate for property taxes in England is indistinguishable from one. Alongside other tests,
this result supports the range of discount rates that we obtain.
Finally, we complement work on energy efficient durable purchases by assessing whether
households undervalue future property taxes for the first time. Home purchases are high
stakes but yet are complex and infrequent decisions which suggests households may be
prone to making optimisation errors. In contrast to some findings from other settings,
we find little evidence for such errors: property tax implied discount rates of 3 to 4%
correspond quite closely to benchmark inter-temporal opportunity cost rates of 1 to 2.5%.
However, interestingly from 2008 we observe that tax-implied rates remain flat, and
thus become somewhat disconnected from prevailing real borrowing and lending rates.
We put forward some tentative explanations, but must largely leave understanding this
28For example, according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies, in 2017/18 property taxes accounted for
9% of UK tax revenues. Corporation taxes accounted for a slightly lower share (8%).
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phenomenon to future work.
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Online Appendix A Data and context
A.1 Institutional details
Although generally considered to operate under a highly centralised model, services pro-
vided by local government organisations in England – including schools, social services,
roads, planning and housing, and policing – account for roughly a quarter of all public
spending. Local government features multiple organisational layers, with some spatial
variation in the way service delivery is structured. The chief organisational unit is the
Local Authority (LA). LA boundaries changed once in our sample period, in 2009, when
a series of mergers reduced the number of LAs from 354 to 326 – see Figure A1.
LAs can have either a single-tier or two-tier structure. Single-tier authorities include
London Boroughs, Metropolitan Authorities, and Unitary Authorities. While LAs with
a single tier structure are responsible for delivering the majority of local services, in some
case such as the Greater London Authority in London, higher authorities may provide
services such as policing, fire protection, and transport across several LAs. In two-tier
authorities, the upper tier (or County Council), is responsible for the majority of services
such as schooling and social services while the lower tier (District Council) is responsible
for other services such as local planning decisions and some housing services. In some but
not all places an additional lower layer of local government exists in the form of parish
and town councils. The 10,000 or so parish and town councils in England provide local
services, including those such as community centres, parks, and play areas, and can also
have a say in local planning decisions.
The majority of these local services are paid for through grants from central government
with locally raised taxes on domestic homes covering some 24.3% of local government
spending in 2014/15. Council Tax has been the main instrument of local taxation on
households in the UK since 1993 when it replaced the highly unpopular Community
Charge (also known as the Poll Tax). Rateable Values, which preceded the Poll Tax,
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Figure A1: Local authorities pre and post 2009
are still used to levy taxes on commercial properties. Rosenthal (1999) presents one of
few empirical studies looking at the capitalisation of property taxes in the UK by using
this taxation system. In general terms the tax is payable on all domestic homes, and in
contrast to many property taxes the liability for the tax rests with occupiers rather than
owners of homes and taxes are not deductible from income taxes. Collection rates are
very high: for example in 2014/15 97% of taxes were collected. This in part reflects that
Councils have significant enforcement powers e.g. the ability to collect regular payments
out of wages or benefits, and can even apply to the Courts to enforce the sale of owned
home to cover unpaid taxes.
A2
Council Tax is essentially a property tax but has a personal element insofar as some
occupants are exempt from the tax or qualify for discounts. Chief among these are that
individuals living alone benefit from a 25% discount, whereas full time students and a
small number of other occupants, for example members of religious communities, people
who are severely mentally impaired and live-in carers, are fully exempt. In addition, a
small number of homes are also exempt from Council Tax, for example furnished homes
owned by a charity, homes where the previous occupant has died, been imprisoned or
hospitalised, and homes that have been repossessed by creditors.
Although Council tax is collected by LAs, it will usually be composed of a series of tax
levies, or precepts, from various authorities within the layers of local government de-
scribed above. Any authority that raises funding through Council taxes in this way is
known as a “precepting authority”. Prior to the start of each financial year, each precept-
ing authority agrees the amount that will be collected by the relevant Local Authority
(or Authorities) on its behalf. Hence, the total amount of Council Tax to be collected in
each administrative sub-division is determined both by the number of layers of local gov-
ernment that area falls within, and the sum being levied by each precepting authorities.
Importantly, the vast bulk of Council Tax represents precepts from LAs with levies from
parishes making up only 0.6% of the total tax burden in 2011/12.
A.2 Housing supply elasticity and capitalisation
As we discuss in the main text, regulatory restrictions on the supply of space are endemic
in the British planning system. This has the effect of making the supply of housing highly
inelastic. This is important in this context because it means that changes in demand will
be reflected in prices: that is to say changes in demand will be capitalised into prices.
We illustrate why this is the case in Figure A2 below. On the left hand side of the Figure,
with perfectly inelastic housing supply, a shift in demand leads to a change in price but
A3
no change in quantity. In contrast, with elastic housing supply (right hand side of the
Figure), the same demand shift leads to both a quantity and a price change. Hence
the shift in demand is not fully capitalised into prices. Hilber (2015) provides a more
complete discussion.
Figure A2: Housing supply elasticity and capitalisation
A.3 Additional information about our data
We supplement our sales and rentals data with additional characteristics from Energy
Performance Certificates (EPCs). Since 2007 an EPC has been required whenever a home
is constructed or marketed for sale or for rent and a dataset for all EPCs issued since 1
October 2008 has recently been released by the UK government. The certificates contain
information of the energy performance of buildings and their physical characteristics
that are obtained by a physical inspection of the interior and exterior of the home by
an independent assessor. We extract various characteristics from this dataset before
merging the information into the Land Registry database. Our merging strategy is to
sequentially match individual sales to the EPC data using the full address or a subset
of the address and the date of the sale and certificate. Specifically, we first match a
sales to certificates using the primary address object name (PAON; usually the house
name or number), secondary address object name (SOAN; usually flat number), street
name, and full postcode then retain the certificate that is closest in days to the sale or
taking the median value of characteristics where there is more than one EPC in the same
A4
year as the sale. We then repeat this exercise for unmatched properties but allowing
one of the PAON or SOAN to be different. Our final round of matching matches on the
full postcode. Any sales that remain after without a match following this process are
considered unmatched and dropped from the analysis. This group represents around 9%
of sales in the Land Registry dataset. The matched dataset provides us the number of
rooms; floor area; and the wall construction type (solid wall or cavity wall). The EPC
data also records the number of extensions that have been added to the property at the
time of the certificate, but provides no detail on the size or nature of any such extension.
We harvest tax data from web sources. Because the tax data and the home sales data
have never been linked before, we conduct a second matching exercise to link sales in the
combined Land Registry-EPC dataset. We again match homes using the full property
address and the postcode of the house, but now use a more conservative matching strategy
given the potential for the measurement error in our main variable when matches are
incorrect. We then link home to actual annual tax payments as described in the main
paper. Combining these data in this way gives us the approximate annual tax payable for
each house at the time of its sale. However, this tax payable will not exactly correspond to
the actual amount of tax payable in all cases because the DCLG data gives us the average
Band D amount for homes in the administrative region, where the average is computed
across all parishes in the LA. While this should accurately capture any precepts from
higher layers of local government (such as levies for the GLA in London), it will not
accurately capture sub-LA variation in parish precepts.
Parish precept data is available from CLG, but only for financial years 2013/14-2016/17.
We extract this data and use it in cross-sectional regressions that use data within this
time-frame to investigate whether this correction has any impact on the results. To
compute home level taxes using the parish level data, we first deduct the average tax-
band specific parish level precept for the LA in the relevant financial year from our LA tax
data, then add back in the actual tax-band specific parish precept for the given parish.
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Table A1: Descriptives statistics: repeat and non-repeat sales
mean sd min max
Panel A: 1km boundary repeat sales
Price 170816 89613 31000 775000
Tax 1093.15 283.88 331.89 2804.42
KS2 score % 0.81 0.08 0.00 1.00
LA spend/head 792.74 657.82 64.09 2797.94
Greenspace 0-500m % 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.96
Rooms 4.28 1.15 1.00 45.00
Built after 1995 % 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Extensions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: 1km boundary non-repeat sales
Price 177877 113737 21500 785000
Tax 1136.45 365.59 214.69 3182.24
KS2 score % 0.81 0.10 0.20 1.00
LA spend/head 858.76 657.04 56.78 2854.64
Greenspace 0-500m % 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.96
Rooms 4.39 1.39 0.00 79.00
Built after 1995 % 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Extensions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
The geographical variables we use in the empirical work include the LA (both pre- and
post-2009), the parish, and the labour-market area in which the home is located in 2011,
and a rural-urban indicator based on the 2011 Rural-Urban Classification.
Regarding school test scores, the only data covering the full span of our sample is the
percentage of pupils obtaining level 4 or higher in Maths, English, and Science tests and
teaching assessments. Using GIS, we create measures of test scores from these data by
averaging across all tests and teaching assessments available for each academic year and
then matching to sales in the subsequent financial year. This means that for example test
scores for academic year 2015/16 (which are published from September 2016) are linked
to our house transactions in financial year 2016/17.
We provide descriptive statistics for our main repeat sales sample in the paper. In Table
A1 we show that repeat sales are closely matched to other sales on observable dimensions.
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A.4 Sample restrictions
The theory underpinning our work indicates that regression of prices (or rents) on taxes
should be estimated in levels (see equation (1)), an issue often neglected in the capital-
isation studies reviewed by Ross and Yinger (1999). We take heed of the theory in our
choice of functional form, and remove outliers which we usually define as the top and
bottom 1% of prices (or rents) and the top and bottom 1% of prices (or rents) in each
tax-band to ensure that extreme prices are not driving our findings. We also drop a small
number of Local Authorities which are extreme outliers in terms of population size or
expenditure on local services. In particular we drop 2 LAs – the City of London and
the Isles of Scilly, which is in any case has no boundaries with other LAs – which both
have populations that are less than half the 1st percentile LA population. We also drop
one further LA: Birmingham which is vastly bigger than all other LAs – its population
and expenditure on services are both more than double the value of the LA at the 99th
percentile. We also note that an article in the Birmingham Post highlights that this
LA is also an outlier as it generates the least income from Council tax despite having a
relatively high charge due to it’s cheap housing.29
29See http://www.birminghampost.co.uk/news/regional-affairs/birminghams-council-tax-
income-lowest-9746303.
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Online Appendix B Other results
B.1 Time variation in β/rT
One assumption in the above estimations is that discount and capitalisation rates are
constant across time, i.e. rTt = rT , r
H
t = rH , and βt = β ∀t. Here, we allow the
discount rate to evolve over time, which is consistent with findings in Bracke et al. (2018).
Differencing between time t and τ , assuming βt = β = 1, and ignoring P for expositional
simplicity we obtain:
∆Vitτ = − 1
rTt
Tit +
1
rTτ
Tiτ +
ρt
rHt
Hi − ρτ
rHτ
Hi (B.1)
Note that when estimating the above equation rTt , and r
T
τ etc. should be internally
consistent. For example, in one transaction pair t − τ , rTt should be the equal to rTτ in
another transaction pair τ − τ˜ . Our solution is to constrain coefficients to be the same
for each year by interacting time dummies with variables, but assigning a positive or
negative sign depending on whether they represent the first sale in year t or the second
sale in year τ for the sales pair in question.
We use this approach to estimate the evolution of implied discount rates in Figure 5. In
Figure B1 below we can further show that the time pattern is very similar for places with
above and below median share developable land averaged over 1991 and 2011. In Figure
B2 we show that the time pattern is also very similar for places with above and below
median change in share developable land between 1991 and 2011. In unreported results
we obtain highly similar results when we use alternative measures of the housing supply
elasticity.
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Figure B1: Time variation: above/below median share developable land in LA
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B.2 Robustness
Sensitivity of our main result in column (6) of Table 3 to changes in specification and
sample are investigated in Tables B1 and B2. The first of these tables shows that estimates
of β/rT are not significantly different to our baseline result under a variety of specification
changes. First, we express all currency variables in 2015 values using the Consumer Price
Index (column (1)). The coefficient is also robust to interacting our boundary trend
controls with a property type indicator in column (2), which implies identification is
achieved by comparisons between homes of the same type across LA boundaries, e.g.
detached houses in Band D. The coefficient is slightly more negative when we replace
property type in this interaction with an indicator for the home being built after 1995
(column (3)). When we re-specify the public good controls (columns (4) and (5)), or
introduce more LA level controls variables (column (6)), the results are robust.
Table B2 in the explores sensitivity to sample selections. The first column increases the
B2
Figure B2: Time variation: above/below median change in share developable land in LA
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Table B1: Sensitivity – specification
(Dep var: ∆ sale price in £)
Dep var: ∆ sale price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Council Tax -27.48∗∗∗ -32.50∗∗∗ -34.74∗∗∗ -29.01∗∗∗ -29.83∗∗∗ -27.09∗∗∗
(7.234) (8.256) (9.041) (8.493) (8.379) (7.627)
Years×band×BFE X X X X
Years×band×BFE×type X
Years×band×BFE×post95 X
Change to baseline: in 2015 fixed fixed linear smooth more LA
prices effects effects LPGs test scores controls
Observations 186843 165236 176708 186843 186843 186843
R2 0.779 0.791 0.772 0.767 0.767 0.767
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered on post 2009 Local Authorities. *** p < 0.01, ** p
<0.05, * p < 0.1. Type in column (2) refers to a categorical variable for the type of property (detached
house, semi-detached house, terraced house, flat). Post95 in column (3) refers to an indicator that
takes value 1 if the home was built after 1995. Continuous test scores in column (5) vary smoothly
over space and are not constrained by LA boundaries. Additional LA controls in column (6) are
population, LA total service expenditure, and value of commercial property in LA (rateable value).
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Table B2: Sensitivity – restrictions
(Dep var: ∆ sale price in £)
Dep var: ∆ sale price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Council Tax -26.59∗∗∗ -27.60∗∗∗ -34.82∗∗∗ -28.91∗∗∗ -30.82∗∗∗ -29.47∗∗∗
(7.225) (8.468) (9.080) (7.825) (9.346) (8.419)
Years×band×BFE X X X X X X
Change to baseline: cut 5% include new drop new allow 1 any time ≥ 3
prices at last sale since 1995 extension gap hab. rooms
Observations 180136 213178 161549 276998 195857 179465
R2 0.773 0.768 0.766 0.744 0.765 0.767
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered on post 2009 Local Authorities. *** p < 0.01, ** p
<0.05, * p < 0.1. Cut 5% of prices indicates that the top and bottom 5% of prices overall and in
each tax band are dropped. Any time gap relaxes the restriction that the gap between sales must be
between 1 and 8 full years.
scale of the restrictions on prices by cutting the top and bottom 5% of prices overall and
in each tax band. The coefficient is somewhat less negative, albeit it is not statistically
discernible from our baseline specification. Consistent with the the result above, we
again find that the coefficient is more negative when we drop homes which we know were
built after 1995. The final three columns show that findings are insensitive to relaxing
selections on extensions and the imposition that the gap between sales must be between
1 and 8 full years and removing small homes that may have only a single occupier (and
hence may qualify for reduced taxes).
In Table B3 we provide a number of robustness checks for the cross-sectional regressions
reported in the main paper. In our main repeat sales results we specify taxes at the
LA level because data for parish level taxes is not available for our whole repeat sales
sample timeframe. Our proposition is that this is unlikely to be a problem as parish
taxes made up only 0.6% of the total tax burden in 2011/12. We confirm here that this
is indeed the case. Findings for rents (columns (1) and (2)) and prices (columns (3) and
(4)) are robust to using Parish-specific taxes, which likely reduces measurement error in
the Council Tax variable. In columns (5) and (6), we also show that non-repeat sales
do not yield significantly different coefficients to repeal sales, which is unsurprising since
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Table B3: Cross sectional robustness
(Dep var: rent or sale price in £)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
- rents - - prices: repeats - - prices: all -
Council Tax -0.90 -1.06∗ -24.33∗ -25.79∗ -28.22∗ -27.27∗
(0.60) (0.64) (13.86) (13.89) (13.80) (14.01)
Council Tax × non-repeat 4.02 5.62
(14.30) (14.11)
Quadratic in LA spend/head X X X
Quadratic in KS2 test scores X X X
Local green space X X X
Home characteristics X X X X X X
Year×taxband×1km BFE X X X X X X
Tax measured at: Parish Parish Parish Parish LA LA
Observations 24906 24906 81103 81093 190155 190145
R2 0.742 0.742 0.928 0.936 0.914 0.921
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis clustered on post 2009 Local Authorities. *** p <
0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.1. All regressions are cross-sectional specifications estimated in
levels. Sample restrictions and controls as in main cross-sectional results.
they have highly similar characteristics to repeat sales (see Appendix Table A1).
B.3 Heterogeneity
Section 6 tested for possible non-linearities by interacting decile of the tax change in our
main sample and then interacting this bin variable with the tax change. We obtain similar
results when we repeat this exercise but taking deciles in the initial tax level (rather than
the tax change) in Figure B3. This leads us to conclude that there is little evidence that
smaller and higher amounts are discounted at different rates in our setting.
We subject our analysis range of further heterogeneity tests using a variety of indicator
variables, displaying results in Figure B4. Estimated tax coefficients are highly similar for:
homes in different tax bands (top left);30 homes in different regions (top right); homes in
neighbourhoods with different median incomes in 2004 (bottom left) and different share
30Note that the coefficient for band F homes is based on a relatively small numbers of observations
(4000 repeat sales), many of which are in London, which may explain the difference in coefficients. Our
main results are insensitive to excluding these sales.
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Figure B3: Effect of taxes on home values for different initial taxes
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of residents with degree in 2011. This is at least suggestive evidence that the discount
rates we uncover can be considered to be a broadly applicable parameter.
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Figure B4: Effect of taxes on home values: further heterogeneity
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